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Abstract: The use of hydrogen storage tanks at 100% of nominal working pressure (NWP) is expected
only after refuelling. Driving between refuellings is characterised by the state of charge SoC <100%.
There is experimental evidence that Type IV tanks tested in a fire at initial pressures below 1/3
NWP, leaked without rupture. This paper aims at understanding this phenomenon. The numerical
research has demonstrated that the heat transfer from fire through the composite overwrap at storage
pressures below NWP/3 is sufficient to melt the polymer liner. This melting initiates hydrogen
microleaks through the composite before it loses the load-bearing ability. The fire-resistance rating
(FRR) is defined as the time to rupture in a fire of a tank without or with blocked thermally activated
pressure relief device. The dependence of a FRR on the SoC is demonstrated for the tanks with defined
material properties and volumes in the range of 36–244 L. A composite wall thickness variation is
shown to cause a safety issue by reducing the tank’s FRR and is suggested to be addressed by tank
manufacturers and OEMs. The effect of a tank’s burst pressure ratio on the FRR is investigated.
Thermal parameters of the composite wall, i.e., decomposition heat and temperatures, are shown in
simulations of a tank failure in a fire to play an important role in its FRR.
Keywords: hydrogen storage tank; state of charge; fire-resistance rating; burst pressure ratio; decom-
position temperature and heat; liner melting
1. Introduction
It was demonstrated previously that the risk of using hydrogen vehicles on London
roads is acceptable if an onboard tank’s fire-resistance rating (FRR), i.e., time to its rupture
in a fire if a thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) is not triggered in a localised
fire or blocked from the fire, is above 50 min [1]. The assessment was performed for
scenarios when onboard hydrogen storage was tank filled to 100% of the nominal working
pressure (NWP). The pressure of the compressed hydrogen storage system (CHSS) is not
always the NWP, i.e., the state of charge (SoC) is below 100%. SAE J2601 defines the
SoC as the “ratio of CHSS hydrogen density to the density at NWP rated at the standard
temperature 15 ◦C”: SoC = [ρ(P, T)/ρ(NWP, 15 ◦C)] × 100 [2]. Normative documents
define the “normal boundary conditions” during the fuelling of NWP = 70 MPa tanks from
0.5 MPa to a maximum of 87.5 MPa, i.e., 1.25 of NWP [2,3]. In our study, we consider
scenarios with NWP = 70 MPa rather than the maximum allowable fuelling pressure of
87.5 MPa. The use of hydrogen tank capacity at NWP or SoC = 100% is characteristic for a
period immediately after tank refuelling only. Figure 1 plots the tank SoC as a function of
hydrogen pressure calculated for different temperatures inside the tank: 20 ◦C, 30 ◦C and
85 ◦C. The last temperature is the currently regulated upper limit during fuelling [2,3].
The above curves were built as a result of calculations of the ratio of hydrogen densities
at the selected temperatures, i.e., 20 ◦C, 30 ◦C and 85 ◦C, and different SoCs and the density
of hydrogen at NWP = 70 MPa and 15 ◦C.
Let us analyse the experimental results of CHSS fire testing at different SoC. In the
experimental work [4], NWP = 70 MPa Type IV tanks of 36 L were tested in localised and
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engulfing fires without TRPD at different SoCs to define their FRR. The initial pressures
were 70.3, 70.6, 35.6 and 17.8 MPa. The fire source was a heptane pan of an area of 0.96 m2.
Tanks filled at 70.3 MPa and 70.6 MPa ruptured after 6 min 32 s and 5 min 20 s respectively.
The first fire test was an engulfing fire and the second tank was tested in a localised
(“partial”) fire. The first important conclusion from these experiments is that the time to
tank rupture depends on neither the engulfing nor the localised fire it is subject to. The
second conclusion is that the tank would not withstand the 10 min localised portion of
the fire test following GTR#13, as the tank will rupture in less than 10 min in the heptane
fire. The authors recommended that the “cylinder as a whole needs to be protected from
localised fire impact” [4].
Figure 1. Tank SoC as a function of storage pressure at temperatures 20 ◦C, 30 ◦C and 85 ◦C.
These experiments also demonstrated that when one of the NWP = 70 MPa tanks
was filled at 35.6 MPa (51% NWP) and underwent the same engulfing fire, it ruptured
later—after 9 min 49 s (the FRR almost 1.5 times longer than the FRR of the first tank filled
at almost NWP, i.e., at 70.3 MPa). This can be explained when the original composite tank
failure in a fire mechanism developed at Ulster University is applied (see for example [5]).
It states that when the resin decomposition front propagating inward inside the composite
tank overwrap encounters an outward expanding load-bearing fraction of the composite
wall thickness, Sload b., a tank ruptures. In this test, with reduced initial pressure, the
thinner Sload b. is required to bear this pressure. Thus, a longer time is required for the resin
decomposition front to travel through the remaining or virgin wall depth to encounter it.
Finally, in the experiments with the tank filled at lower pressure of 17.8 MPa (25%
NWP), the hydrogen leak without tank rupture was observed at 11 min 4 s. In this case,
the thermally degradable virgin wall thickness fraction was larger, thus it allowed for the
heat transferred inside which had melted the liner. The authors state that hydrogen “was
leaking across its entire surface with slightly more leakages at the ends” and that during
the test “epoxy resin seems to have disappeared but the carbon fibres did not burn” [4].
There is another experimental study on fire testing of NWP = 70 MPa 36 L Type IV
tanks at different initial pressures [6]. There were no hydrogen gas temperature measure-
ments, but the composite in-depth integrated thermocouples showed the initial temper-
atures to be about 42 ◦C (315 K). The fire source was represented as a hydrogen-oxygen
premixed burner consisting of 4 pipes directed at tanks from two opposite sides. The tanks’
filling pressures were 70 MPa (NWP), 52.5 MPa (75% NWP), 25 MPa (36% NWP) and
10 MPa (14% NWP). The first two tanks, one at pressure 70 MPa and another at 52.5 MPa,
ruptured after 3 min 58 s and 5 min 11 s respectively. The other two tanks, filled at lower
pressures, i.e., 25 MPa and 10 MPa respectively, did not rupture but leaked after 6 min 40 s
and 8 min 10 s respectively. These experiments had even been performed with a different
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fire source, confirming the conclusions of the previous study [4]. Indeed, the lowered initial
pressures in the tank would avail the larger virgin wall thickness portion to be decomposed
without causing a rupture, while the liner would be melted and could allow hydrogen to
escape through the hydrogen non-tight composite wall.
The liner material, e.g., high density polyethylene (HDPE), being a thermoplastic
polymer, may have a melting temperature of 118 ◦C [7] up to 135 ◦C [8]. Before the melting
point, the polymer undergoes its property alterations as a solid body, such as an elastic
modulus, known to be obtained at a heat distortion temperature [9]. Afterwards, as the
temperature elevates, the polymer becomes softer until it becomes a liquid at the melting
point. The assumption is that when the tank is in a fire, the hydrogen leak starts when
the entire liner thickness reached the minimum of the polymer melting temperature. This
implies that the liner in that spot starts flowing plastically, being unable to perform a barrier
function to hydrogen, thus allowing it to escape and permeate/leak through the composite
(that is not tight to hydrogen). Some tank manufacturers tend to use other thermoplastics
for the liners, such as Nylon, i.e., polyamide (PA). PA has a higher melting temperature,
e.g., 129 ◦C [10].
The UN Global technical regulation on hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles No. 13 (GTR#13) [3],
the EC No. 406/2010 implementing the Regulation No. 79/2009 [11] establish the minimum
burst pressure, Pb.min., for tanks overwrapped with carbon fibre reinforced polymer (CFRP)
to be 2.25 times NWP, i.e., the burst pressure ratio (BPR). This means that for the 70 MPa
tank, its wall will be able to withstand up to 2.25 × 70 MPa = 157.5 MPa. It should be
noted that the BPR is different to the tank safety factor (SF) and is defined as the ratio
of Pb.min. to the maximum allowable pressure during the fuelling P = 87.5 MPa. Hence,
the SF for a CFRP overwrapped 70 MPa tank with Pb.min. = 157.5 MPa would be SF =
157.5 MPa/87.5 MPa = 1.8. There are discussions at UN ECE GTR#13 IWG SGS on the
reduction of this burst pressure ratio from BPR = 2.25 to BPR = 2.00. This is only the
minimum requirement and any higher value is accepted, especially if the safety, and not
only the availability of carbon fibre is at stake, e.g., BPR = 2.5, which is quite common. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, the effect of the BPR on the FRR of tanks has not been
studied and published.
The original tank failure in a fire mechanism suggested at Ulster University has
been proven to work well in predicting the tank’s FRR. For the entire tank wall thickness,
SCFRP, withstanding 157.5 MPa, only its fraction of 1/2.25 = 0.44 is sufficient to withstand
NWP = 70 MPa. The remainder of the fraction 1 − 0.44 = 0.56 would be as called here
“load+”, which can be thermally decomposed by heat flux from a fire without tank rupture
(thus reducing burst pressure ratio to BPR = 1). If the tank pressure increases above
NWP = 70 MPa, e.g., due to increasing temperature because of heat transfer from a fire, the
Sload b. increases proportionally and thus, the “load+” fraction decreases. Thus, for instance,
for the tank of NWP = 70 MPa and current pressure, Pcurrent = 70 MPa too, the load-bearing
wall fraction will be as Sload b. = Pcurrent/(NWP × BPR) = 70 MPa/(70 MPa × 2.25) = 0.44.
The higher the current pressure in the tank is, Pcurrent, the thinner the fraction “load+” is
and the faster it will degrade, causing tank rupture. If the tank pressure decreases, e.g.,
due to blowdown in a fire through TPRD, Sload b. will decrease respectively. It will allow
for more heat transfer through the tank wall and for a longer time, with subsequent liner
melting. This is the mechanism behind the “no rupture but a leak” of tanks in fire tests
with lower pressure compared to the NWP initial hydrogen pressure in a tank observed
experimentally in [4,6].
The above-described tank failure in a fire mechanism implies that a tank with a
varying wall thickness will rupture when it loses the load-bearing ability in the thinnest
wall location, which is usually the dome area. The wall thickness non-uniformity issue
in the state-of-the-art designs of composite hydrogen tanks was raised by the authors
previously. Composite-overwrapped tanks are usually manufactured by the filament
winding process. During the winding process, a combination of helical and hoop layers
in the cylindrical/sidewall region usually provides a thicker wall. The thinnest regions,
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mostly wound as helical layers, are the domes, especially midways between the cylindrical
part end and the boss neck. These thinnest regions nevertheless are sufficient to provide
mechanical strength to the tank up to Pb.min., which it is designed for. Due to the reduced
thickness, the dome is more vulnerable to a fire. The tank’s FRR will be defined by
resin thermal degradation and the composite failure in the dome region rather than in
the sidewall [5,12]. Figure 2 schematically demonstrates the tank composite overwrap
performance in a fire in the sidewall (left) and the dome (right) regions at the same moment.
Figure 2. Wall thickness SCFRP of the overwrap in the cylindrical/sidewall region (left) and in the dome region (right)
and positions of load-bearing and decomposed fractions of wall thickness at the same time: no rupture conditions for the
sidewall and rupture conditions for the dome [12].
The manufacturers focus mainly on the mechanical strength of the composite over-
wrap, rather than its thermal performance in a fire. Carbon fibres would either be the
last component of the composite to degrade thermally in a fire or would be not degraded
at all, as noted in the experimental study [4]. The worst-case scenario of tank rupture
may occur due to TPRD malfunction or a localised fire when TPRD is not affected. The
loss of the composite overwrap’s strength will be determined by the resin degradation,
as per the above-described tank failure in a fire mechanism [5,12]. The speed of the resin
decomposition front in-depth progression is affected by the heat flux from the fire to the
tank surface, resin decomposition temperature range, Td, the heat of decomposition, Hd,
etc. Variations of these parameters affect the tank FRR.
Data on the Td of the resins found elsewhere shows that these usually range within
300–400 ◦C (573–673 K). The relatively low decomposition temperatures can be 592 K, as
per 10% of mass loss, as obtained by the thermogravimetric analysis [13]. In [14] it was
stated that the first stage of decomposition (resin oxidative decomposition) occurs between
496–730 K. The resin Td published in [15,16] are 623 K and 633 K respectively. Paper [17]
provides data on Td varying 569–639 K. Some applications have epoxy resins with Td = 713
K [18]. In paper [19], the Td of the epoxy resins in composites with polypropylene content
were analysed; Td varied 553–648 K. The work [20] provides Td = 647 K. In our study we
shall investigate the effect of resin Td on the tank FRR, using the values that are close to or
within the above-reviewed ranges of 554–683 K [21] and 643–653 K [17,20].
The resin Hd varies depending on the literature source. For instance, study [22]
recommends Hd = 3.50 × 105 J/kg. Another differential scanning calorimetry study [21]
of CFRP in a nitrogen atmosphere helped to “isolate” resin decomposition from carbon
with two peaks at 652 K and 810 K respectively. The first temperature peak agrees with
most of those met in literature values of Td, where the mass loss is the highest, and where
we assume the mechanical strength of the composite was lost (due to the loss of fibres’
bonding). The second peak agrees well with that mentioned in another study temperature
measurement (813 K) [23] when the resin is degraded completely. The cumulative for these
two stages Hd = 3.48 × 104 J/kg + 3.04 × 104 J/kg = 6.52 × 104 J/kg.
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This study aims to investigate the effect of the state of charge (SoC), burst pressure
ratio (BPR) and thermal properties of a resin in a composite tank overwrap, i.e., Hd and
Td, on tank FRR. The issue of the tank wall thickness non-uniformity on FRR is addressed
also. The study will be performed using the validated non-adiabatic blowdown in a fire
model [5,12].
2. The Model and Parameters of Studied Tanks
The non-adiabatic blowdown in a fire model, including the mechanism of a composite
hydrogen tank failure in a fire, is described in detail in [5,12]. The under-expanded jet
theory is used to describe this model. It was developed further and included the tank
performance in fire conditions. The thermal degrading of the resin in a composite and
the melting of the liner due to the unsteady heat transfer from the surroundings through
the tank wall and liner are accounted for. The blowdown experiment and destructive fire
test for a tank with no TPRD were used to validate the model. The thermal characteristics
of hydrogen and tank materials, heat flow from a fire to the tank, diameter of TPRD that
the tank is equipped with, and the TPRD activation time delay in a fire, are among the
model inputs. Experimentally obtained hydrogen temperature and pressure dynamics,
depressurization time and tank fire-resistance rating, i.e., time to rupture in a fire (when no
TPRD installed), are all correctly reproduced in the model.
Here, the model is applied to simulate the pressure dynamics inside the tank, temper-
ature distribution inside the composite wall, liner, and hydrogen temperature during the
fire. The dependence of the FRR as a function of the HRR/A [5] demonstrates that FRR
practically does not change at HRR/A ≥ 1 MW/m2. The absence of a further decrease in
FRR with the increase of HRR/A above 1–2 MW/m2, which are typical values for gaso-
line/diesel spill fires, can be explained by the flame length increase above the tank location
for this fire test protocol. Hence, the fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2 and corresponding
transient heat flux to the tank surface is selected here to study the thermal behaviour of
tanks in the fire at different initial pressures below the NWP. The heat flux to the tank q′′
from the fire at a specific heat release rate HRR/A = 1 MW/m2 was extracted from 3D
simulations of the tank in a fire. The heat flux as a function of time used in our simulations
is: q′′ = (−11.81· ln(t) + 113.97) × 103 [5]. This heat flux was applied throughout all our
simulations for consistency. Table 1 represents the properties of the investigated three
tanks, including thermal decomposition temperature and heat of decomposition.
Table 1. Tank material properties.
Parameter Value References
HDPE liner
SHDPE, mm 5.27 [24]
λ, W/m/K 0.4 at 293 K, 0.2 at 423 K
[25]cp, J/kg/K 2000 at 293 K, 2600 at 423 K
ρ, kg/m3 940
CFRP structural layer
SCFRP, mm 22.26 [24]
λ, W/m/K Correlation
[21]cp, J/kg/K Correlation
ρ, kg/m3 1360 [26]
Hd, J/kg
6.52 × 104 * [21]
3.50 × 105 [22]




Notes: *—Sum of two degradation stages Hd = 3.48 × 104 J/kg + 3.04 × 104 J/kg = 6.52 × 104 J/kg [21]; **—
Hypothetical value two times larger than the value referenced in this table of 2 × 3.50 × 105 J/kg = 7 × 105 J/kg
(this is for demonstration purpose, i.e., how the FRR changes if the tank manufacturer chooses the resin with the
higher Hd).
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Table 2 shows the difference in parameters of the three tanks studied in this paper.
Table 2. Parameters of three 70 MPa tanks.
Parameters Tank#1 [24,27,28] Tank#2 [29] Tank#3 [6]
V, L 36 62.4 244
PNWP, MPa 70 70 70
Burst pressure ratio (BPR) 2.25 ** 2.25 ** 2.25 **
Dext, mm * 325 437 530
L, mm 909 748 2154
SCFRP, mm * 27.75 24.3 33.36 [5] **
SHDPE, mm * 3.8 3 3 [5] **
Notes: *—Sidewall (cylindrical) part; **—assumption.
It is assumed in our study that all composite overwraps are made of the same CFRP
and the liners are the same HDPE in all tanks, to be consistent in comparison to the tests.
The initial tank and hydrogen gas temperature are 293.15 K, giving 70 MPa calculated
SoC = 99% (it is 100% for hydrogen T = 288.15 K at 70 MPa).
3. Effect of Tank SoC on Fire-Resistance Rating
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the inward propagation of the resin decomposition
front and outward propagation of the load-bearing wall thickness fraction for three initial
pressures, i.e., NWP = 70 MPa and two reduced initial pressures 24 MPa and 17.8 MPa, in
a 36 L volume tank. Therefore, 3 different load-bearing wall thicknesses were obtained,
i.e., about 2.6 mm, 3.4 mm and 9.9 mm (excluding liner) for 17.8 MPa, 24 MPa and 70 MPa
respectively. The dependence of the load-bearing wall thickness on the tank SoC was
described as a part of the tank failure mechanism in the Introduction. The simulations
show that for the initial pressure equal to NWP = 70 MPa, the tank ruptures after 402 s in
the fire (when the two fronts meet).
Figure 3. Performance of tank V = 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: rupture
at initial pressure NWP = 70 MPa (SoC = 99%) and no rupture at initial pressures 24 MPa (SoC = 43%)
and 17.8 MPa (SoC = 32.6%).
The decrease in pressure to 17.8 MPa (in NWP = 70 MPa, 36 L tank), the same as in
the experiment [4], excludes the tank rupture in the fire due to melting of the liner after
700 s. Instead, the hydrogen leakage through the wall would be initiated (see Figure 3).
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The tank’s SoC = 32.6% was calculated as follows. Hydrogen density at NWP = 70 MPa
and T = 15 ◦C (288.15 K) is ρ = 40.54 kg/m3 (calculated by Abel-Noble equation of state
for real gas). Hydrogen density at 17.8 MPa and T = 20 ◦C (293.15 K) is ρ = 13.22 kg/m3.
For 17.8 MPa we obtain SoC = [13.22 kg/m3/40.54 kg/m3] × 100% = 32.6%. It should be
underlined that the ratio of initial pressure to NWP is less, i.e., 17.8/70 × 100% = 25.4%.
The simulated 70 MPa tank with the initial pressure of 17.8 MPa in the fire with no
rupture but leakage, is the accurate reproduction of the result observed in fire tests with the
same tanks at an initial pressure of 17.8 MPa [4]. Afterwards, in the simulation, we increase
the pressure to the maximum upper bound value, above which the tank will rupture. The
initial pressure of 24 MPa (SoC = 42.5%) was found to be “on the border” between rupture
and leak and this is very close to the experimental value of 25 MPa [6] (only 4% difference),
where the leak without burst was observed. It is seen that with the decrease in the tank
SoC, the “load plus” thickness (everything above the load-bearing wall thickness black
curves), enabling for a longer time for the resin decomposition front to travel and therefore,
increasing the tank FRR or allowing for the liner to melt and provide leak initiation.
The performance of the 62.4 L tank at 70 MPa (rupture) and 30 MPa (no rupture) is
shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Performance of tank V = 62.4 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: rupture
at initial pressure NWP = 70 MPa and no rupture at initial pressure 30 MPa.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the 62.4 L, NWP = 70 MPa tank will not rupture in the fire
if hydrogen pressure inside the tank is 30 MPa (SoC = 51%). This is believed to happen
due to the increased wall thickness for the tank of a bigger volume, and the thinner liner,
making it melting faster.
The performance of the 244 L, NWP = 70 MPa tank at pressure 70 MPa (rupture) and
32 MPa (no rupture) is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows an effect similar to the 62.4 L tank trend, but the initial hydrogen pres-
sure sufficient for leak and rupture prevention is slightly higher, i.e., 32 MPa (SoC = 54%),
as the composite is thicker in the 244 L tank.
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Figure 5. Performance of tank V = 244 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: rupture
at initial pressure NWP = 70 MPa and no rupture at initial pressure 32 MPa.
4. Effect of Tank Wall Thickness Non-Uniformity on the FRR
Let us assume that both the dome and the sidewall of the tank are subject to a fire.
Figure 6 shows the performance of both these parts in a fire for 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa tank
causing a rupture and lowered pressure preventing rupture by causing hydrogen leak.
Figure 6. Performance of tank V = 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: effect of thinner wall thickness
in the dome (top) and thicker sidewall (bottom) for two initial pressures, i.e., NWP = 70 MPa and the pressure below which
the liner melts and the tank rupture is excluded (17.8 MPa and 29 MPa respectively).
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In the considered example (36 L and NWP = 70 MPa tank), the dome part has a liner
thickness of 5.27 mm and a CFRP thickness of 22.26 mm while the sidewall has 3.81 mm and
27.75 mm for a liner and CFRP respectively. Moreover, the load-bearing wall thicknesses
(excluding liner) are 9.9 mm and 11.4 mm for pressure 70 MPa for dome and sidewall
respectively. The thickened liner in the dome region is probably the manufacturer’s
technical necessity as it is near the liner-flange connection.
Figure 6 demonstrates that, as expected, at NWP = 70 MPa the increase of composite
wall thickness by 20% from 22.26 mm (dome) to 27.75 mm (sidewall) results in an increase
of FRR by 34%, i.e., from 402 s (6 min 42 s) to 540 s (9 min).
The initial pressure that prevents rupture should be higher, if we consider the com-
posite failure location in the sidewall, i.e., the SoC should not be decreased as much as
for the sidewall region. This is due to the thinner liner requiring less energy for melting,
hence the “load plus” may be thinner to maintain wall integrity. The liner melts in the
sidewall at an initial pressure of 29 MPa with SoC = 50% (Figure 6 bottom). Assuming
the failure location in the dome region, the required reduced pressure is only 17.8 MPa
with SoC = 32.6% (Figure 6 top). In the engulfing fire, the tank would rupture after 402 s
if failed in the dome area, while the sidewall can still bear the load. This is an apparent
disadvantage in the current design of composite storage tanks that should be addressed by
tank manufacturers and OEMs.
5. Effect of the Burst Pressure Ratio on the FRR
In this section, the effect of BPR on FRR for NWP = 70 MPa tanks will be assessed. The
minimum regulated BPR for CFRP is currently 2.25. The increase in the BPR by a manufacturer
does not violate the regulations. Let us use the described above 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa tank and
alter the BPR by altering the composite wall thickness proportionally to the burst pressure.
Thus, BPR = 2.25 bears the pressure 70 MPa × 2.25 = 157.5 MPa, whereas BPR = 2 bears
140 MPa and BPR = 2.5 bears 175 MPa respectively. As the tank wall thickness in the dome area
for BPR = 2.25 is 22.26 mm, then we calculate the wall thickness for BPR = 2 as 22.26 mm/2.25
× 2 = 19.78 mm and BPR = 2.5 as 22.26 mm/2.25 × 2.5 = 24.73 mm respectively.
The higher BPR decreases the fraction of Sload b. and hence increases the “load+”
faction and the tank FRR. Figure 7 shows the effect of different BPR of 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa
tank on its FRR and time to leak.
Figure 7. Performance of tank V = 36 L, NPW = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2. (Left): tank with BPR = 2.
(Right): tank with BPR = 2.5.
Figure 7 demonstrates an increase in the tank FRR with the increase of its BPR. The
FRR increases by 43% for the BPR increase from 2 to 2.5, i.e., from 296 s (4 min 56 s) to
519 s (8 min 39 s). The increase in the BPR from 2 to 2.5 allows exclusion of tank rupture
at higher pressure, i.e., 23 MPa (BPR = 2.5) instead of 17 MPa (BPR = 2). The decrease of
currently regulated BPR = 2.25 (see Figure 3 above) to the proposed BPR = 2 (see Figure 7
left) would decrease the FRR from 402 (6 min 42 s) s to 296 s (4 min 56 s), i.e., by 26%.
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6. Effect of Resin Thermal Properties, Td and Hd, on the FRR
According to our tank failure mechanism, the fraction of the composite wall thickness,
e.g., a layer, becomes non-load-bearing after the resin decomposition front reaches this
layer and passes it. The resin decomposition front is described by the resin decomposition
temperature range between Td1 and Td2 and the resin heat of decomposition, Hd, energy
consumed to decompose the resin polymer when the temperature in the layer is within
T ≥ Td1 and T ≤ Td2. Let us study how the parameters of resin in composite, such as Hd
and Td, affect the resin decomposition front propagation and hence the tank FRR.
First, we shall fix Hd = 3.5 × 105 J/kg and change the decomposition temperature
ranges to see the effect of Td on the FRR. Let us take Td range as 554–683 K (as in all previous
simulations) and a higher one of 643–653 K (initial Td increased by 89 K), as per references
in Table 1. We shall look at FRR for 36 L at NWP = 70 MPa and lower pressures sufficient
to make the liner melt and prevent tank rupture (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Performance of tank V = 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: effect of resin Td on the tank
FRR at fixed Hd = 3.5 × 105 J/kg. (Left): effect of Td on FRR. (Right): effect of Td on the upper-pressure limit that excludes
tank rupture and time to leak.
Figure 8 left demonstrates that a higher Td (by 16%) increases the tank FRR from 402 s
(6 min 42 s) to 511 s (8 min 31 s), i.e., by 27%. It also allows prevents tank rupture by
melting the liner at a significantly higher hydrogen pressure inside the tank of 35 MPa
(SoC = 58%) instead of 17.8 MPa (SoC = 32.6%), as shown in Figure 8 right.
Figure 9 shows the effect of three different Hd on tank FRR at the fixed Td range
554–683 K.
Figure 9. Performance of tank V = 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa in a fire with HRR/A = 1 MW/m2: effect of different resin Hd on
the tank FRR at fixed Td range 554–683 K at 70 MPa (left) and other different SoC (right).
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The increase in the resin Hd increases the tank FRR (Figure 9 left). For instance,
the previously used 3.5 × 105 J/kg compared to hypothetical value 7 × 105 J/kg (100%
increase) raises the tank FRR to 496 s (8 min 16 s), i.e., by 23%. In this respect, we see that
doubling of resin Hd gives a relatively small FRR increase. It can be concluded that the
effect of Td is stronger compared to Hd, resulting in an increase of FRR with Td (27% and
16% respectively).
Figure 9 right shows that the higher the resin Hd is, the higher the upper limit of
pressure inside the tank, which prevents tank rupture due to the liner melting, i.e., 12.5 MPa
(SoC = 24%), 17.8 MPa (SoC = 32.6%) and 27.5 MPa (SoC = 48%).
7. Conclusions
The effect of 70 MPa Type IV tank SoC on the FRR is studied using a previously
validated model of non-adiabatic tank blowdown in fire conditions with our original
mechanism of a composite tank failure in a fire. The experimentally observed phenomenon
of tank leaking instead of rupture in a fire at initial pressures below about NWP/3 is
accurately reproduced in the simulations and underlying physics is discussed. The effect
of tank wall non-uniformity on the reduction of the tank FRR is studied. It is concluded
that tank manufacturers should address this issue to provide a higher level of life safety
and property protection by increasing the FRR. The effect of composite properties such as
the resin heat of decomposition, Hd, and a range of decomposition temperature, Td, as well
as the burst pressure ratio (BPR) on the tank FRR is investigated and understood. The FRR
increases with the increase of Td and Hd, yet the effect of Td is more pronounced. These
findings define the originality of this work.
The significance of the study is in the closure of knowledge gaps in understanding
a tank performance in a fire at different SoCs, the expansion of the validation domain
of the physical model that can reproduce the experimental data. It is demonstrated that
the tanks with selected material properties, NWP = 70 MPa and volumes 36 L, 62.4 L
and 244 L do not rupture in a fire at SoC = 43% corresponding to hydrogen pressure of
24 MPa, SoC = 51% (30 MPa) and SoC = 54% (32 MPa) respectively. The wall thickness
and non-uniformity of the selected industrial 36 L tank demonstrated the difference in
FRR of 34%. The increase in the tank FRR by 43% was found for the BPR increase from
2 to 2.5. It was shown that the increase in resin Td has a stronger effect than Hd on the
FRR increase. The avoidance of a catastrophic tank rupture in a fire at a decreased SoC
due to melted liner and hydrogen release is only possible for Type IV tanks, and not for
Type III tanks, where the liner is metallic. This is a safety advantage of Type IV tanks. The
safety “feature” achieved through “no rupture but a leak” phenomenon may open a strand
of safety questions to be answered, such as what would be the effect of liner polymer
type, e.g., thermoset vs. thermoplastic? How would the leak react in the event of a fire
termination, e.g., when a hydrogen-powered car is rapidly towed out of a fire, or even
when fire extinction with water is applied? The leak behaviour depending on a fibre and
resin in the composite overwrap is also an open question.
The rigour of this study is in the reproduction of the experimentally observed phe-
nomenon of leaking of tanks at hydrogen pressures below about NWP/3, due to the use
of referenced thermal parameters in simulations. The numerical tests performed for the
industrial 36 L, NWP = 70 MPa tank and the decreased initial pressure of 24 MPa (and
below) demonstrated the prevention of tank rupture due to the liner melting and follow-up
leakage of hydrogen through the tank wall. This pressure is in line with the experimentally
determined pressure of 25 MPa [6] (4% difference) when the tank leakage was observed
instead of rupture. A further pressure decrease to 17.8 MPa, matching with equivalent
experimental pressure [4], also provided the rupture avoidance due to liner melting, as
observed in the corresponding experiment [4] with another fire source. The rigour of the
work is also underpinned in the range of studied parameters that affect the FRR. These
include the SoC below 100%, including the limits of SoC below which the tanks leak in the
fire instead of rupture; the wide range of tanks’ volumes, i.e., 36 L, 62.4 L and 244 L, etc.
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